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NOTES
In jurisdictions other than Louisiana, courts have reached
the same conclusion with reference to statutory change from
hanging to either electrocution 26 or lethal gas.2 7
In the Pierre case28 and the subsequent case of State v. Burks2 9
the judge sentenced the defendant to death by hanging and the
trial court amended the sentence to make it comply with the pro-
visions of Act 14 of 1940. In Henry v. Reid0 the sentence was to
die "in the manner provided by law" so that the executive head
of the government could order the execution according to the
statute then in force. This form of the sentence was also held
valid in a later case.3 1
We come to the conclusion that the method of carrying out
the death penalty is as unessential an element as are the time and
the place, and that it may be changed by the legislature even
after the accused has been found guilty or has been sentenced,
and its change at such a time does not deprive the defendant
of any of his substantial rights. Actually it works to his advan-
tage because thus the state is free to adopt the most modern and
humane method of inflicting capital punishment.
A.C.
NEGLIGENCE - DANGEROUS PREMISES - LICENSEE AND INVITEE
DISTINGUISHED--Plaintiff, a sixteen year old boy, entered the shop
office of defendant railroad company in search of the superin-
tendent. His purpose was to solicit defendant's advertising for a
local newspaper. While waiting outside the shop, he was injured
when one of several metal car wheels, which were negligently
stacked, fell upon him. Held, plaintiff was an invitee and as such
was owed the duty of reasonable care with respect to the condition
of the premises. The court, having found that the plaintiff was
entitled to protection against negligence, allowed recovery under
26. Woo Dak San v. State, 36 N.M. 53, 7 P. (2d) 940 (1931); Shipp v.
State, 130 Tenn. 491, 127 S.W. 317 (1914).
27. Hernandez v. State, 43 Ariz. 424, 32 P. (2d) 18 (1934); Shaugnessy v.
State, 43 Ariz. 445, 32 P.(2d) 337 (1937); State v.Brown, 342 Mo. 53, 112 S.W.
(2d) 568 (1938).
28. 200 La. 808, 9 So. (2d) 42 (1942), commented on in (1943) 5 LoUISNA
LAW REvIEw 259.
29. 202 La. 167, 11 So. (2d) 518 (1942), commented on in (1943) 5 LOUISANA
LAW REVIEW 578.
30. 201 La. 857, 10 So.(2d) 681 (1942), commented on in (1943) 5 LOt'SIANA
LAW REVImW 578.
31. Iles v. Flournoy, 202 La. 29, 11 So.(2d) 16 (1942).
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the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.1 Mercer v. Tremont & Gulf Rail-
way Company, 19 So. (2d) 270 (La. App. 1944).
It is generally held that one whose status is that of a licensee
accepts the premises as he finds them and must be alert for his
own safety. The only duty owed a licensee is that of warning
him of dangerous conditions which are known to the occupier
and which the licensee could not be expbcted to discover for
himself.2 On the other hand, the business guest, or invitee, as he
is sometimes called, is entitled to assume that preparations for
his safety have been made, and he is owed the duty of reasonable
care with respect to the condition of the premises." The distinc-
tion between these two classes of persons has been recognized on
several occasions in Louisiana.'
There is considerable difference of opinion as to the basis of
distinction between a licensee and invitee.5 It is generally held
that a business guest or invitee is one who comes upon the
premises- for a purpose in which both he and the occupier have
some sort of business interest.' If this mutual interest exists, it is
not important whether the business guest came at the suggestion
or request of the defendant or entered upon his own initiative. 7
In the latter instance it is commonly said that the existence of
the "invitation" is implied.8 Conversely, if a person is upon the
1. Pizzitola v. Letellier Transfer Co., 167 So. 158 (La. App. 1936); Rome v.
London and Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 169 So. 132 (La. App. 1936);
Jones v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 185 La. 1067, 171 So. 447 (1936); Loprestie v.
Roy Motors, Inc., 191 La. 239, 185 So. 11 (1938).
2. Restatement of the Law of Torts, §§ 340-343; Myers v. Gulf Public
Service Corp., 15 La. App. 589, 132 So. 416 (1931).
3. Baucum v. Pine Woods Lumber Co., 130 La. 39, 57 So. 577 (1912).
4. Mills v. Heidingsfield, 192 So. 786 (La. App. 1939).
5. The Restatement of the Law of Torts, §§ 330-332 bases the difference
on "business interest." Prosser, Busin~ess Visitors and Invitees (1942) 20 Can.
Bar Rev. 357, 393: "When premises are thrown open to the public, the
occupier assumes responsibility for their safe condition toward any member
of the public who may enter for the purpose for which they are open,
regardless of whether he brings with him the hope of profit or 'benefit.'
"When premises are not open to the public, the individual may still be
entitled to protection if he enters under circumstances which give him
reasonable assurance that care has been taken to make the place safe for his
reception. Visits for the performance of contracts, and for other economic
advantage to the occupier, usually are made upon such implied assurance.
"When premises are not open to the public, the individual is not entitled
to protection where he does not enter under circumstances giving him reason-
able assurance that the place has been made safe for him; and this is true
whether or not he confers benefit upon the occupier."
6. Ibid.
7. Mills v. Heidingsfleld, 192 So. 786 (La. App. 1939).
8. To come under an implied invitation, a visitor must come for a
purpose connected with the business in which the occupant is engaged, or
which he permits to be carried on, and there must be some mutuality of
interest. Plaintiff who went to the railroad station to mail a letter was held
to be invitee. Bell v. Houston and S. R. Co., 132 La. 88, 60 So. 1029 (1913).
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premises of another for his own personal purposes, he is a
licensee even though an express invitation may have been
extended him by the defendant? However, in border situations
the existence of an invitation to enter business premises tends to
indicate that the occupier considered the purpose of the visit as
being in the interest of his business, while the absence of an invi-
tation is persuasive of the fact that the plaintiff was a licensee.'0
Cases in which the plaintiff enters the defendant's premises
as a salesman or solicitor with only the hope of arousing the
latter's interest in a business transaction have given the courts
considerable trouble." There is a tendency to regard such a
person as an invitee only when the prospective business would be
clearly advantageous to the occupier, as where the existence of
previous dealings between them indicates a likelihood of interest
by the defendant. Where, under these circumstances, the entry
is onto non-business premises, the courts are generally reluctant
to regard the plaintiff's purpose as one in which the occupier
would have a business interest. Thus, where a prospective tenant
was injured while on residential property which he had entered
for the purpose of determining whether or not the premises may
be available for his tenancy at a future date, the court refused
recovery on the ground that the plaintiff's status was that of
licensee. 2 In the principal case, although the premises were not
generally open to the public, it is to be expected that the
defendant should, anticipate the presence not only of workmen
but likewise of those having general business to transact with the
railroad. Furthermore, newspaper advertising by railroads is a
current practice, and it may be safely assumed that these com-
panies consider it to be profitable. The decision is in line with the
modem tendency to enlarge the group of persons classified as
business guests. Narrow distinctions depending on the purpose
of entry by the plaintiff are not only productive of confusion and
uncertainty, but likewise encourage falsification of testimony.
The court, having held that the plaintiff was entitled to the
exercise of reasonable care, properly applied the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. This doctrine has frequently been employed in
9. Vargas v. Blue Seal Bottling Works, Ltd., 126 So. 707 (La. App. 1930).
10. Myers v. Gulf Public Service Corp., 15 La. App. 589, 132 So. 416 (1931).
11. Southwest Cotton Co. v. Pope, 25 Ariz. 364, 218 Pac. 152 (1923);
Hartman v. Miller, 17 A.(2d) 652 (Pa. Super. 1941).
12. Mills v. Heidingsfleld, 192 So. 786 (La. App. 1939).
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Louisiana in the case of falling objects.1' Its use, however, would
clearly not be available if the plaintiff were a trespasser or a
licensee."
R.O.
13. In reference to falling objects, see Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and
Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases (1941) 4 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 386; Lonatro v. Palace Theatre Co., 5 La. App. 386 (1926);
Ramon v. Feitel House Wrecking Co., 17 La. App. 193, 134 So. 426 (1931);
Pizzitola v. Leteiller Transfer Co., Inc., 167 So. 158 (La. App. 1936).
14. Boyett v. Chicago R. I. and P. R. R., 123 La. 579, 49 So. 200 (1909).
